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ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO 
PRIVACY WARRANTS GREATER 




Alaska’s legislature should pass a comprehensive data privacy law to prevent 
companies’ exploitation of citizens’ personal data. The Alaska Constitution 
explicitly provides Alaskans with the right to privacy and calls upon the 
legislature to protect that right. Despite this explicit right, Alaskans’ privacy 
rights are vulnerable to exploitation by private companies. Proposed legislation 
to address this vulnerability should ensure data privacy protection, but the 
legislature should remain cognizant of concerns regarding innovation and 
business. To best achieve this balance, the legislation should be founded in 
generally accepted data privacy principles and should establish strong financial 
penalties for companies that violate the law. The legislation should also be 
flexible enough to avoid stifling innovation and unreasonably increasing 
compliance costs. More specifically, the law should allow companies to provide 
financial incentives to consumers in exchange for permission to collect, use, 
and share their data. Privacy legislation that meets these goals will effectively 
protect data privacy, while simultaneously enabling companies to innovate and 
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“[S]ome of the most prominent and successful companies have built 
their businesses by lulling their customers into complacency about 
their personal information. They’re gobbling up everything they can 
learn about you and trying to monetize it. We think that’s wrong.”  
– Tim Cook, Apple CEO1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Personal data has become a lucrative commodity, generating billions 
of dollars for the private companies that collect it.2 Data’s value is derived 
from its versatility—it can be used to improve the customer experience, 
refine marketing strategy, generate cash flow, drive business decisions, 
promote product development, and even secure additional data.3 Data-
driven innovation has revolutionized the way individuals interact with 
the world, offering services that make everyday life more convenient. 
However, “with prodigious potential, comes prodigious risk.”4 
Today, private companies collect information regarding shopping 
habits, religious affiliations, sexual preferences, and personal 
relationships, as well as locational and sensitive health data.5 All this data, 
with few sector-specific exceptions,6 can be used however the company 
wishes.7 The lack of regulation is concerning: the sensitive nature of this 
 
 1.  LEANDER KAHNEY, TIM COOK: THE GENIUS WHO TOOK APPLE TO THE NEXT 
LEVEL 167 (2019).  
 2.  MICHAEL CHERTOFF, EXPLODING DATA: RECLAIMING OUR CYBER SECURITY IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 77 (2018). To further understand the value of data, consider 
another quote by Apple CEO Tim Cook: “Every day, billions of dollars change 
hands and countless decisions are made on the basis of our likes and dislikes, our 
friends and families, our relationships and conversations, our wishes and fears, 
our hopes and dreams. These scraps of data, each one harmless enough on its 
own, are carefully assembled, synthesized, traded and sold.” Tim Cook: Personal 
Data Collection is Being ‘Weaponized Against Us with Military Efficiency,’ CNBC (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/10/24/apples-tim-cook-warns-silicon-
valley-it-would-be-destructive-to-block-strong-privacy-laws.html. 
 3.  See generally Adam C. Uzialko, How Businesses are Collecting Data (And 
What They’re Doing With It), BUS. NEWS DAILY (Aug. 3, 2018), https:// 
www.businessnewsdaily.com/10625-businesses-collecting-data.html.  
 4.  Zynep Tufekci, We’re Building a Dystopia Just to Make People Click on Ads, 
TEDTALK (1:51) (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/zeynep_ 
tufekci_we_re_building_a_dystopia_just_to_make_people_click_on_ads. 
 5.  CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 73.  
 6.  Entities that must comply with at least some privacy-specific regulations 
are healthcare, banking, and credit reporting companies, and companies that 
knowingly collect children’s data. See infra Section III.C. 
 7.  See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 3 TEX. L. REV. 85, 146 (2014) 
(explaining how the FTC can pursue privacy violations when the company has 
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data can result in the denial of medical insurance, unfavorable 
employment decisions, discriminatory ad targeting, and other forms of 
discrimination.8 Furthermore, a company that collects data during its 
regular course of business can sell it to whichever commercial, 
ideological, or political actor is willing to pay.9 Malicious actors can also 
gather detailed intelligence on specific individuals and use that data to 
undermine the integrity of elections, radicalize and recruit vulnerable 
populations, and disseminate false information.10 
A comprehensive privacy regime could safeguard citizens against 
malicious uses of data by providing people with greater control over their 
personal information and by encouraging companies to implement 
internal consumer data protections. However, the United States’ current 
federal privacy regime fails to adequately protect consumer data,11 and it 
seems unlikely that Congress will pass comprehensive federal privacy 
legislation any time in the near future.12 Therefore, legislation protecting 
Alaska citizens from potential exploitation should come from Alaska’s 
government. 
The potential exploitation of Alaska resources is not a novel 
problem. The trend of data exploitation, although not unique to Alaska, 
is strikingly similar to the exploitation of natural resources that Alaska 
has previously confronted. Alaska’s abundance of natural resources has 
resulted in both economic booms and busts throughout its history.13 
Outsiders have flocked to Alaska, seeking to profit from these valuable 
resources only to leave once they have made their fortunes.14 These 
economic booms contributed to Alaska’s growth. However, the economic 
 
deceptive or misleading privacy policies). 
 8.  See infra Section III.A. 
 9.  See CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 42 (describing the utility of data). 
 10.  DONALD J. TRUMP, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 31–
35 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-
Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.  
 11.  See infra Section III.C. 
 12.  This is largely because of the presidential impeachment hearing, the 
looming 2020 elections, and Congress’s general inability to pass legislation. See 
Trump Impeachment: A Very Simple Guide, BBC (Dec. 19, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39945744 (summarizing the 
Trump impeachment proceedings); see also Drew Desilver, A Productivity Scorecard 
for the 115th Congress: More Laws Than Before, But Not More Substance, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/ 
01/25/a-productivity-scorecard-for-115th-congress/ (noting that the current 
Congress is one of the least productive in history). 
 13.  See ERIC SANDBERG, ALASKA DEPT. LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., A HISTORY 
OF ALASKA POPULATION SETTLEMENT 9−12, 15−16 (Sara Whitney ed., 2013) 
(discussing the economic booms and busts resulting from gold and oil 
discoveries). 
 14.   Id.  
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busts forced Alaskans to consider how to utilize resources to drive 
economic growth while simultaneously preventing exploitation.15 
In their effort to address this issue, Alaskans have made a conscious 
effort to mitigate those risks. Alaska’s statehood movement was spurred 
largely by concerns over control of Alaska’s natural resources.16 Many 
pre-statehood residents traced the exploitation of Alaska’s resources “to 
[the] sins of omission and commission by the federal government.”17 They 
believed the only way that residents could regain control of fish and 
wildlife, minerals, forests, and other resources was through statehood.18 
Accordingly, the framers incorporated these basic objectives into the 
Alaska Constitution by adding a section dedicated to the protection of 
natural resources.19 And in the following decades, Alaska learned from 
the experiences during pre-statehood and used its constitution as 
inspiration to find solutions addressing new threats to the state’s natural 
resources.20 
Once again outsiders are exploiting Alaska’s resources and taking 
the profits for themselves. Much like the exploitation in the past, this 
recurrence can be attributed to “sins of omission and commission by the 
federal government.”21 The lack of federal legislation protecting data 
privacy on a national scale enables this exploitation. However, Alaska’s 
government has the explicit authority to mitigate these risks and protect 
 
 15.  GORDON HARRISON, ALASKA LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS AGENCY, ALASKA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE 129–30 (5th ed.  2012), http:// 
w3.legis.state.ak.us/docs/pdf/citizens_guide.pdf (discussing the legislative 
history surrounding the inclusion of natural resource rights under the Alaska 
Constitution). 
 16.  GERALD A. MCBEATH & THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, ALASKA POLITICS & 
GOVERNMENT 126 (1994). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See HARRISON, supra note 15, at 129−30 (explaining the legislative history 
surrounding the passage of article VIII of the Alaska Constitution). 
 19.  Id.; see also ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their 
natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common 
use.”); ALASKA CONST., art. VIII, § 15 (“No exclusive right or special privilege of 
fishery shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This 
section does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery for 
purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress among fishermen 
and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the efficient 
development of aquaculture in the State.”). The second part of section 15 was 
added through a 1972 amendment to authorize an exception to the first sentence’s 
prohibition, allowing the state to institute a limited entry program for distressed 
fisheries. HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38. 
 20.  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.010–46.03.045 (2018) (implementing 
policies regarding environmental conservation); id. §§ 46.11.020–46.11.070 
(implementing policies regarding conservation of energy and materials); id. § 
46.35.300 (discussing the extension of resource extraction or removal related 
permits). 
 21.  See MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 16. 
37.1 BUCHANAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:12 PM 
2020 ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO PRIVACY 29 
Alaskans. Unlike the United States Constitution, the Alaska Constitution 
expressly provides its citizens with the right to privacy.22 Despite this 
explicit right, Alaska does not currently afford data privacy protection 
above the minimum federal protection.23 
The Alaska Supreme Court has relied on Alaska’s constitutional 
right to privacy to protect Alaska citizens from privacy intrusions by the 
government; however, it has refused to extend these protections to 
violations perpetrated by private companies.24 Thus, in order to protect 
its citizens from such violations, the Alaska legislature should pass 
comprehensive privacy legislation. This law should borrow key aspects 
from California’s and the European Union’s comprehensive privacy 
regulations. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II will describe Alaska’s 
explicit right to privacy and explain how Alaska’s interest in privacy has 
hindered greater data protection. Part III will justify why the legislature 
should pass comprehensive privacy legislation. It will specifically focus 
on the harms associated with unregulated data usage, tort law’s inability 
to adequately protect data privacy, the lack of federal comprehensive 
privacy legislation, and the benefits that would be provided through 
comprehensive data privacy legislation. Part IV will discuss how 
American values generally and Alaskan values specifically change the 
calculus of what should be included within the act. Finally, Part V will 
explain key elements that the legislature should include within the bill, 
borrowing various ideas from the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the California Consumer Protection 
Act (CCPA). 
II. ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE COURT’S 
INABILITY TO SUFFICIENTLY PROTECT IT 
This Section will proceed by first briefly explaining Alaska’s 
longstanding tradition of protecting individuality and privacy. 
Specifically, it will discuss Alaska’s explicit right to privacy and how the 
court has interpreted the constitutional privacy protection with regard to 
data privacy. It will also describe the limitations on the court’s powers 
and explain why the legislature must be the branch to protect Alaska 
citizens from data exploitation by private companies. 
 
 22.  See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this 
section.”). 
 23.  See infra Part II. 
 24.  See infra Section II.B. 
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A. Alaska’s Tradition of Respecting Privacy and Individuality 
Alaska has a longstanding tradition of respecting privacy and 
individuality.25 Many of Alaska’s early settlers were escaping various 
forms of misfortune, trouble, and misconduct.26 Others simply found life 
too constricting within developed cities and communities of the lower 
forty-eight and sought refuge at the edge of the frontier.27 The Alaska 
Supreme Court has recognized this uniqueness, stating that: 
[O]ur territory and now state has traditionally been the home of 
people who prize their individuality and who have chosen to 
settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a measure of 
control over their own lifestyles which is now virtually 
unattainable in many of our sister states.28 
These characteristics have evolved into Alaska’s general policy of 
tolerance towards personal idiosyncrasy, unconventional lifestyle and 
thought, and personal privacy.29 
Demonstrating the importance of individuality and privacy to 
Alaskans, Alaska is only one of eleven states30 with an explicit right to 
privacy in its constitution.31 Article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution 
declares that “[t]he right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall 
not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.”32 Section 
22 was added to the constitution by an amendment in 1972 in response to 
the development of a computerized database of information on the 
criminal history of individuals.33 The legislature feared that such a system 
would result in privacy intrusions reminiscent of a “Big Brother” 
government surveillance regime leading to the constitutional 
 
 25.  Susan Orlansky & Jeffrey M. Feldman, Justice Rabinowitz and Personal 
Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional Framework, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).  
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
 29.  Orlansky & Feldman, supra note 25, at 1. 
 30.  The other ten states that have explicit rights to privacy in their 
constitutions are Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Montana, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington. Privacy Protections 
in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22. 
 33.  HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38. In 1971, the FBI implemented a 
computerized system called the Computerized Criminal History (“CCH”) 
Program. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CRIMINAL HISTORY 
RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 49 (1992), https://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/CCHUSE.PDF. The CCH held the full criminal history records 
for both federal offenders and state offenders from participating states. Id. 
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amendment’s proposal and ratification.34 
Although the legislative history specifically reflects concerns about 
the government controlling vast amounts of data on individuals, it also 
suggests a broader concern about large amounts of data in the hands of 
powerful entities. It is unlikely that the legislators at the time of the 1972 
amendment could have imagined the situation of today—private 
companies collecting, controlling, using, and selling data as personal as 
geolocational or medical information. However, the language of the 
amendment itself depicts a remarkable level of foresight, explicitly 
directing the Alaska legislature—the most flexible and representative 
branch of government—to pass legislation to protect Alaska citizens’ 
privacy.35 
Despite the Alaska Constitution’s explicit call for the legislature to 
implement the right to privacy, the legislature has been reluctant to act 
within the data privacy sphere.36 Only one law exists that even 
tangentially addresses data privacy: the Personal Information Protection 
Act,37 which specifically pertains to data breaches.38 However, the law 
provides no guidance on how private companies should collect, store, 
use, or protect consumer data; it simply requires companies to notify 
consumers of a breach.39 Due to the legislature’s inaction, the Alaska 
Supreme Court has largely carried out the implementation, development, 
and protection of this right. 
B. Limitations on the Court’s Powers to Regulate Privacy Violations 
State courts may interpret state constitutional provisions 
independent of federal law when those provisions lack a federal 
constitutional equivalent, such as Alaska’s explicit right to privacy.40 The 
 
 34.  HARRISON, supra note 15, at 38. The delegates to the constitutional 
convention sixteen years earlier were also concerned about technological 
intrusion into the lines of ordinary citizens’ lives; however, that fear was limited 
to wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Id. The delegates considered, but 
ultimately rejected, including the following language in the constitution’s 
unreasonable searches and seizures section: “The right of privacy of the 
individual shall not be invaded by use of any electronic or other scientific 
transmitting, listening or sound recording device for the purpose of gathering 
incriminating evidence. Evidence so obtained shall not be admissible in judicial 
or legislative hearings.” Id. 
 35.  See ALASKA CONST., art. I, § 22 (“The legislature shall implement this 
section.”). 
 36.  See infra Section III.A.  
 37.  Personal Information Protection Act, ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010–995 
(2018). 
 38.  See generally id.  
 39.  See generally id. 
 40.  Jeffrey M. Shaman, Eighteenth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law: 
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Alaska Supreme Court has done precisely that, and has as a consequence 
expanded Alaska citizens’ privacy rights beyond those of citizens 
elsewhere in the United States. The court has stated: 
Since the citizens of Alaska, with their strong emphasis on 
individual liberty, enacted an amendment to the Alaska 
Constitution expressly providing for a right to privacy not found 
in the United States Constitution, it can only be concluded that 
the right is broader in scope than that of the Federal 
Constitution.41 
Reflecting this willingness to expand Alaskans’ right to privacy 
beyond the federally recognized right to privacy, the court has recognized 
that medical marijuana users have an interest in keeping their usage and 
medical condition private;42 that police officers have legitimate 
expectations of privacy regarding their personnel files;43 that a statute 
requiring a person who places a political advertisement in a newspaper 
“reveal his name, address, occupation, employer, and the amount of his 
expenditure” burdens his right to privacy;44 and most recently, that sex 
offenders have a legitimate expectation of privacy in preventing the 
widespread publication of their conviction and personal information.45 
Despite touting privacy rights in the aforementioned situations, the 
Alaska Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand data privacy rights 
to actions perpetrated by private actors. In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska 
Drilling,46 the supreme court addressed whether Alaska’s constitutional 
right to privacy could be applied to private actors.47 The court explicitly 
refused to extend constitutional protections to private actors’ privacy 
violations.48 The court noted that article I, section 22 failed to provide 
guidance on how the right should be applied, and that the legislature had 
not exercised its power pursuant to article I, section 22.49 The court 
explained that the primary purpose of the constitutional right to privacy 
is to protect “personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted 
 
Article: The Right of Privacy in State Constitutional Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 971, 988 
(2006). 
 41.  Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494514−15 (Alaska 1975) (Boochever, J., 
concurring). 
 42.  Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 752–53 (Alaska 2001). 
 43.  Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 738 (Alaska 1990). 
 44.  Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 86 (Alaska 1980). 
 45.  Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 444 P.3d 116, 128 (Alaska 2019). 
 46.  768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). 
 47.  Id. The precedent set in Luedtke remains controlling. See Miller v. Safeway, 
102 P.3d 282, 287–88 (Alaska 2004) (utilizing Luedtke to support the assertion that 
an Alaskan’s right to privacy cannot be violated without state action). 
 48.  Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1129. 
 49.  Id. 
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intrusions by the State.”50 However, within the same analysis, the court 
recognized constitutional clauses in other jurisdictions that prohibit 
private action, leaving open the possibility that Alaska’s constitutional 
right to privacy could be applied to private action.51 Despite 
acknowledging this possibility, the court refused to extend the right to 
privacy to the private actions involved in the case.52 The court explained 
that the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that Alaska’s 
constitutional right to privacy was intended to apply to private actors.53 
Thus, the precedent set in Luedtke and the general lack of evidence 
regarding the constitutional amendment’s drafters’ intent make it 
unlikely that the court will protect citizens from privacy violations 
perpetrated by private actors. If Alaska wants to protect its citizens from 
privacy violations by private companies, then the legislature must be the 
branch to act. Importantly, article I, section 22 of the Alaska Constitution 
explicitly calls on the legislature to act. Therefore, the Alaska legislature 
should draft a comprehensive privacy bill to carry out its responsibilities 
by protecting its citizens’ privacy. 
III. WHY THE ALASKA LEGISLATURE SHOULD PASS 
COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
This Section will explain why the Alaska legislature should pass 
comprehensive privacy legislation. It will first discuss how data can be 
used to harm Alaska citizens. It will then describe how tort law 
insufficiently protects data privacy. Next, it will describe the current 
federal data privacy regime and its deficiencies. Then, it will explain the 
potential benefits to companies that could result from comprehensive 
federal privacy legislation. 
A. The Misuse of Data Can Harm Citizens 
Data is valuable because it can be used to predict and assess 
behavior, to facilitate better-informed business decisions, and to increase 
revenue.54 The more data a company has, the more accurate its 
 
 50.  Id.  
 51.  Id. at 1129−30. 
 52.  Id. at 1130. 
 53.  Id. The court further explained that “absent a history demonstrating that 
the amendment was intended to proscribe private action, or a proscription of 
private action in the language of the amendment itself, we decline to extend the 
constitutional right to privacy to the actions of private parties.” Id. 
 54.  See John Akred & Anjali Samani, Your Data is Worth More Than You Think, 
MIT SLOAN (Jan. 18, 2018), https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/your-data-is-
worth-more-than-you-think/. 
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predictions will be.55 Thus, companies are incentivized to collect as much 
data as possible on consumers.56 
Consumer data can be used for benign purposes such as marketing 
or improving products.57 However, the data can also be used for 
discriminatory purposes, whether it be intentional or unintentional. For 
example, health insurance companies can collect and use unprotected 
sensitive health information to make coverage decisions by incentivizing 
voluntary disclosure through reduced rates and rewards, or by 
purchasing it from fitness tracking companies.58 The data collected 
through these mechanisms are not protected by federal privacy laws and 
can be used to predict an individual’s risk of a significant medical event.59 
The results of the risk assessment will inform a company’s decision on 
whether to cover that individual—unhealthy or high-risk individuals 
could be denied coverage. The health insurance company that denies 
coverage could then sell the individual’s data to other health insurance 
companies, ensuring that the individual cannot obtain health insurance, 
all because of potentially flawed predictions of medical risk unconfirmed 
by a medical professional. 
Another possible discriminatory use includes employers who build 
algorithms to uncover statistical relationships in data sets of potential 
employees.60 The use of such algorithms, though efficient, can cause 
classification bias—employer reliance “on classification schemes, such as 
data algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality 
or disadvantage along the lines of race, sex, or other protected 
characteristics.”61 Additionally, targeted ads can be discriminatory. For 
 
 55.  Sarah Littler, The Importance and Effect of Sample Size, SELECT STATISTICAL 
SERVS., https://select-statistics.co.uk/blog/importance-effect-sample-size/ (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2019). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Louis Columbus, Ten Ways Big Data Is Revolutionizing Marketing And Sales, 
FORBES (May 9, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2016/05/ 
09/ten-ways-big-data-is-revolutionizing-marketing-and-sales/#2f9cc0721cff.  
 58.  In 2018, an insurance company, John Hancock, announced that all of its 
policies would come with the option to let the company track your fitness through 
its website or a fitness tracker like Fitbit. Christopher Ingraham, An Insurance 
Company Wants You to Hand Over Your Fitbit Data so it Can Make More Money. 
Should You?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
business/2018/09/25/an-insurance-company-wants-you-hand-over-your-fitbit-
data-so-they-can-make-more-money-should-you/. This program would come 
with lower rates and rewards for meeting fitness goals, which seems great for 
healthy customers. Id. 
 59.  See infra Section III.C. 
 60.  Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 857, 865 (2017). 
 61.  Id. at 866. Consider a company called Gild, which offers a “smart hiring 
platform” to assist companies in finding “the right talent quicker.” Id. at 862. 
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example, a bank could target individuals who post information online 
about recently losing their job because they are considered a likely 
candidate for a high-interest loan.62 These individuals are targeted 
because they fall within the category of people the bank is attempting to 
reach, despite the fact that the person might qualify for a much lower 
rate.63 
Furthermore, a company’s client list is largely protected from public 
disclosure, making it difficult to hold companies accountable for the 
entities to which they sell information.64 Thus, malicious actors can obtain 
consumer data from legitimate businesses and use it to radicalize and 
recruit individuals and to disseminate false information.65 This nefarious 
use of data was exemplified through the Russian interference in the 2016 
presidential election. The Internet Research Agency (IRA)—a private 
organization, with ties to the Russian government—successfully engaged 
in a misinformation campaign designed to cause instability and to 
influence the 2016 election.66 The IRA directly engaged with tens of 
millions of Americans, targeting particularly vulnerable subsections of 
the population, to spark controversy and sow discord among 
Americans.67 
 
Guild’s algorithm analyzes thousands of pieces of information to calculate 
“around 300 larger variables about an individual: the sites where a person hangs 
out; the types of language, positive or negative, that he or she uses to describe 
technology of various kinds; self-reported skills on LinkedIn; [and] the projects a 
person has worked on, and for how long,” as well as traditional criteria such as 
college major and education. Id. 
 62.  White House Says Big Data Can be Used to Discriminate Against Americans, 
NPR (Apr. 26, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/white-house-
says-big-data-used-discriminate-americans. A person who lost his job is more 
likely to fall behind on his mortgage and thus might be more willing to accept a 
high-interest loan to catch up. Id.  
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Matthew Crane, The Limits of Transparency: Data Brokers and 
Commodification, 20 NEWS MEDIA & SOC’Y 88, 94 (2018), https:// 
journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1461444816657096 (“Congress has 
largely failed to compel data brokers to identify information sources and 
clients.”). 
 65.  TRUMP, supra note 10, at 12−13, 31−35 (describing how information can be 
used to harm the United States and its citizens). 
 66.   ROBERT S. MUELLER, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4 (2019), https:// 
www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf.   
 67.  Id. Facebook’s General Counsel estimated that “roughly 29 million people 
were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA’s 80,000 posts over 
the two years.” Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election, Hearing Before the S. 
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (testimony of Colin Stretch, 
General Counsel, Facebook). However, because these posts were also shared, 
liked, and followed by people on Facebook, he believed that three times more 
people might have been indirectly exposed to a story posted by the IRA. Id. Stretch 
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Additionally, technology has also granted non-state actors military 
and political capabilities that were previously inconceivable. Specifically, 
the Internet and data aggregation has greatly expanded terrorist and 
radical groups’ ability to recruit.68 Today, terrorist and radical 
organizations no longer aimlessly recruit on a quantitative basis.69 
Instead, these groups engage in misinformation and propaganda 
campaigns similar to those carried out by the Russians during the 2016 
election.70 Data allows these groups to send specific messages to a target 
population based on a certain set of values, preferences, and demographic 
attributes.71 The Internet generally and social media specifically provides 
the perfect medium to radicalize and recruit individuals.72 The Internet 
provides anonymity and a degree of protection from detection that allows 
individuals to exhibit behaviors and attitudes that would be unacceptable 
in the physical world.73 Additionally, the Internet can act as an echo 
chamber, where potential recruits are flooded with material focused on 
their preferences.74 Exposure to differing viewpoints and opinions is more 
difficult to encounter.75 Thus, terrorist and radical organizations can 
effectively normalize radical beliefs in potential recruits by using the 
Internet and data obtained from private companies.76 
Due to data’s potential to facilitate discrimination and to be 
weaponized against the citizenry, the Alaska legislature should pass a law 
requiring private companies to reasonably protect consumer data. 
Comprehensive data privacy legislation will promote better data 
practices that reduce the possibility that data will be used for 
 
estimated that approximately 126 million people might have received content 
from an IRA-associated page at some point during the two-year period. Id. 
 68.  GABRIEL WEIMANN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, WWW.TERROR.NET: HOW MODERN 
TERRORISM USES THE INTERNET 6−7 (2004); see also Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad”: 
The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror, 40 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 10, 10 (2017); see also INES VON BEHR ET AL., RADICALISATION IN THE 
DIGITAL ERA: THE USE OF THE INTERNET IN 15 CASES OF TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM xii 
(2013), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/ 
RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf. 
 69.  WEIMANN, supra note 68. 
 70.  UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE USE OF THE INERNET FOR 
TERRORIST PURPOSES 3−5 (2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/ 
Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf. 
 71.  Id.; WEIMANN, supra note 68; see e.g., Rudner, supra note 68, at 12. 
 72.  See WEIMANN, supra note 68. The process entails direct contact with the 
individual, but also indirect contact such as promulgating false stories that 
provide a false sense of validation in the vulnerable individual. See id. at 144 
(explaining how hackers can shape an individual’s viewpoint). 
 73. INES VON BEHR, supra note 68, at 18. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. 
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discriminatory purposes or accessed by malicious actors. 
B. Current State Tort Law Provides Insufficient Protection Against 
Privacy Violations 
Currently, tort law is the only remedy that Alaskans have against 
private actors that violate their privacy rights. There are four privacy torts 
that states generally recognize:77 (1) intrusion upon seclusion;78 (2) public 
disclosure of private fact;79 (3) false light;80 and (4) misappropriation.81 
Alaska, however, only recognizes two of these four torts: false light82 and 
intrusion upon seclusion.83 Neither of these torts sufficiently protects 
individual privacy against private companies’ misuses.84 Specifically, 
false light requires that the false depiction of the plaintiff would be 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and that the plaintiff “had 
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the 
publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be 
placed.”85 The highly offensive requirement is difficult to establish in the 
context of corporate use of personal data. Companies often collect, use, 
and disseminate information in bits and pieces, frequently involving 
relatively innocuous information that fails to be highly offensive when 
each act is taken separately.86 Thus, few plaintiffs will be able to succeed 
on a false light cause of action against a company’s use of their personal 
data. 
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is also insufficient to protect an 
 
 77.  See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (dividing 
privacy torts into four distinct torts).   
 78.  Intrusion upon seclusion is the “[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion 
or solitude, or into his private affairs.” Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, 
Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889–90 (2010). 
 79.  Public disclosure of private fact is the “[p]ublic disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff.” Id. 
 80.  False light is “[p]ublicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye.” Id. 
 81.   Misappropriation is the “[a]ppropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, 
of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” Id. 
 82.  See State v. Carpenter, 171 P.3d 41, 53, n.21 (Alaska 2007) (adopting the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS’ description of a false light claim). 
 83.  See Greywolf v. Carroll, 151 P.3d 1234, 1244–45 (Alaska 2007); Eli A. Meltz, 
No Harm, No Foul? “Attempted” Invasion of Privacy and the Tort of Intrusion Upon 
Seclusion, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3431, 3440 (2015).  
 84.  In fact, “it is becoming increasingly clear that the common law invasion 
of privacy torts [in general] will not help to contain the destruction of [data] 
privacy.”84. Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey 
Rosen, 89 GEO. L. J. 2029, 2043 (2001). 
 85.  Carpenter, 171 P.3d at 53, n.21. 
 86.  Richards & Solove, supra note 78, at 1919. 
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individual’s data privacy.87 Intrusion upon seclusion requires an entity to 
“intentionally intrude[], physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.”88 Two elements 
must be met for the plaintiff to succeed: (1) the plaintiff has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and (2) the defendant’s manner of intrusion was 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.89 The plaintiff is unlikely to 
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of corporate 
collection of personal data. Much of the data collected and used by private 
companies originates from the public domain or is voluntarily provided 
to the company in exchange for services, and courts have concluded that 
the collection and use of such data does not invade a person’s privacy.90 
Even if a consumer succeeds in overcoming these procedural 
hurdles, the tort system in general is still flawed. First, it is difficult to 
establish standing in a case alleging a privacy tort. To establish standing, 
a plaintiff must prove three elements: “(1) an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely 
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”91 To establish injury in 
fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered “an invasion of a legally 
protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”92 Mere procedural violations 
are insufficient to constitute an injury in fact.93 Normally, a company’s 
sale or use of an individual’s personal data does not result in a provable 
particularized injury.94 Thus, plaintiffs alleging a privacy violation face an 
uphill battle establishing standing. 
 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Greywolf, 151 P.3d at 1244−45. 
 89.  Id. at 1245. 
 90.  Richards & Solove, supra note 78, at 1919. Individuals generally do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in documents or information that is 
voluntarily provided to and maintained by a third party because those 
individuals have neither ownership nor possession of that information—
commonly known as the third-party doctrine. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743−44 (1979) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in information 
voluntarily turned over to third parties); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–
41 (1976) (holding that the plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
bank records because they had neither ownership nor possession of the 
documents). 
 91.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
 92.  Id. at 1548 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
 93.  Id. at 1550. 
 94.  See Lee J. Plave & John W. Edson, First Steps in Data Privacy Cases: Article 
III Standing, 37 FRANCHISE L.J. 485, 489 (2018) (“In many data breach lawsuits, 
plaintiffs who have had their personal data compromised are unable to prove that 
they are actually the victim of fraud or have suffered any tangible economic loss. 
Instead, these plaintiffs generally argue that, because of the data beach, they are 
at a greater risk of future identity theft or other harm.”). 
37.1 BUCHANAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/29/2020  10:12 PM 
2020 ALASKA’S EXPLICIT RIGHT TO PRIVACY 39 
Additionally, the action of filing suit will likely bring more attention 
to an already sensitive issue. An individual will have to relive the 
embarrassment of the initial privacy invasion by discussing it in a public 
hearing and having the information entered into public record.95 Finally, 
it is extremely difficult to recover substantial monetary damages from 
privacy tort lawsuits, shifting a plaintiff’s cost-benefit analysis further 
away from filing suit in the first place.96 Thus, the privacy tort system 
inadequately addresses the modern privacy problems associated with the 
collection, use, and dissemination of consumer data. 
C. The Lack of Federal Legislation Protecting Personal Data Generally 
Comprehensive federal data protection regulation does not exist. 
Instead of passing a federal comprehensive privacy law that regulates the 
collection, processing, and use of data by all private companies, Congress 
has passed a multitude of sectoral legislation that regulates businesses 
operating within specific industries.97 These laws include the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA),98 the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA),99 the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA),100 the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act (COPPA),101 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).102 
These sectoral laws are limited in applicability. For example, FCRA 
protections are limited to the disclosure of information that is collected 
for the purpose of establishing credit, employment, or insurance 
eligibility. 103 RFPA only protects against the disclosure of consumer 
financial records to other private companies or to the government.104 
 
 95.  Jacqueline D. Lipton, Mapping Online Privacy, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 506 
(2010). 
 96.  See id. at 505 (noting that courts have been reluctant to compensate 
plaintiffs for nonmonetary harms resulting from violations of privacy). 
 97.  Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Security Law: What Korean Companies Need 
to Know, PAUL HASTINGS, http://www.paulhastings.com/area/privacy-and-
cybersecurity/privacy-and-security-law-what-korean-companies-need-to-know 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2019). 
 98.  Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (Oct. 26, 1970) (codified as amended at 15 
USC §§ 1681-1681t (2018). 
 99.  12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–22 (2018). 
 100.  Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C. (2018)) 
 101.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2018)). 
 102.  Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C. (2018)). 
 103.  James X. Dempsey and Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data and National 
Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2004). 
 104.  Id. at 1478. In 2003, RFPA was expanded to include all records of specified 
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Furthermore, the GLBA’s privacy provision applies only to financial 
institutions,105 while COPPA only applies to a website that knowingly 
collects, uses, or discloses personal information on children under 
thirteen.106 Finally, although HIPAA provides strong protections,107 it 
only applies to personally identifiable health information held by a 
covered entity.108 Covered entities are narrowly defined, including only 
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who 
electronically transmit health information in connection with a 
transaction.109 
In addition to the aforementioned sectoral laws, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) has broadly interpreted its power to regulate 
“unfair”110 and “deceptive”111 trade practices under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act to patrol data privacy violations.112 Despite having the broadest 
 
businesses, such as real estate agents, jewelers, car dealers, pawnshops, and travel 
agencies. Id.; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL 
SECURITY LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL BACKGROUND 19 
(2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf (providing background 
information on the Right to Financial Privacy Act). 
 105.   FED. TRADE COMM’N, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE PRIVACY OF CONSUMER 




 106.  Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2018)); Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/ 
guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions#General%20Questions 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2019). 
 107.  Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, CAL. DEPT. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., https://www.dhcs.ca.gov/ 
formsandpubs/laws/hipaa/Pages/1.00WhatisHIPAA.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 
2019). 
 108. HIPAA Privacy Rule: Information for Researchers, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS.: NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/ 
pr_06.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2019). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Unfair methods are defined as acts or practices that (1) cause or are likely 
to cause substantial injury to consumers that (2) are not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers, and (3) the injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2018). 
 111.  Deceptive acts or practices are defined as (1) material statements or 
omissions that (2) are likely to mislead consumers (3) acting reasonably under the 
circumstances. Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm., to 
Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. On Energy and Commerce 1–2 (October 
14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/ 
410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf. 
 112.  Section 5 of the FTC Act states that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018). 
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power to regulate privacy violations across sectors, the FTC currently 
lacks the resources and authority necessary to adequately protect 
consumer privacy.113 
As highlighted above, these laws do not cover most personal data 
that private companies collect, including shopping habits, religious 
affiliation, sexual preferences, locational data, sensitive health 
information, personal relationships, and other metadata.114 Therefore, 
until the federal government passes a comprehensive privacy regulation, 
the responsibility for protecting most consumer data falls on the states, 
meaning that it is the Alaska legislature’s responsibility to protect its 
citizens’ data. 
D. Potential Benefits to Companies Created By Comprehensive 
Privacy Law 
A common argument against comprehensive privacy legislation is 
that the increased regulation will stifle innovation.115 However, not all 
innovation should be encouraged, at least not without appropriate 
regulation and oversight. Innovation must be balanced against the 
potential harm it might cause. Innovation at the expense of safety and 
morality is generally deemed socially unacceptable. For example, twenty-
two states and the District of Columbia have passed laws limiting the use 
of autonomous vehicles, citing concerns about safety.116 These states have 
 
 113.  The FTC does not have the ability to issue outright fines for unfair or 
deceptive trade practices. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (explaining the FTC’s 
remedial powers). Instead, it may only challenge these practices by initiating 
administrative adjudications. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND 
RULEMAKING AUTHORITY (2019). The FTC’s power to issue legislative, legally 
binding rules is extremely limited due to the overly burdensome rulemaking 
process that is required. Beth DeSimone & Amy Mudge, Is Congress Putting the 
FTC on Steroids?, SELLERBEWARE BLOG (Apr. 26, 2010), http:// 
www.consumeradvertisinglawblog.com/2010/04/is-congress-putting-the-ftc-
on-steroids.html; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, OPERATING MANUAL § 7.2.3.1 (1971) 
(“Section 202(a) of Magnuson-Moss provides that the Commission’s § 18 
authority is its only authority to promulgate rules respecting unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices.”).  
 114.  CHERTOFF, supra note 2, at 73. Metadata is internet/telephonic addresses 
and routing instructions that identify the recipient and the sender of various 
materials over the internet or telephone. Id. 
 115.  See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL 
DATA PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY 
FRAMEWORK 29 (2010), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ 
iptf_privacy_greenpaper_12162010.pdf (noting that commenters on the Privacy 
and Innovation Notice of Inquiry expressed concerns that national legislation 
would stifle innovation). 
 116.  Jack Karsten & Darrell West, The State of Self-Driving Car Laws Across the 
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determined that the risks posed by autonomous vehicles warrant 
increased regulation, despite the fact that this regulation will increase the 
cost to autonomous-vehicle-producing companies.117 Another example is 
that most countries around the world have banned human reproductive 
cloning.118 These countries have determined that the potential moral and 
ethical consequences that might result from human reproductive cloning 
outweigh the benefits of such an innovation, at least until the proper 
ethical framework can be developed to enable it.119 Thus, certain 
limitations to innovation should be considered if the innovation raises 
safety or moral concerns, like those associated with unregulated data 
collection.120 
Furthermore, increased regulation does not necessarily stifle 
innovation.121 In fact, increased regulation can encourage positive 
innovation by incentivizing companies to actively seek solutions to 
problems that were previously ignored.122 This is because, through 
regulation, companies are forced to work within specific limitations that 
did not previously exist.123 For example, stringent emission standards 
accelerated the pace at which the automobile industry studied 
combustion, facilitating innovation in emission control and fuel 
economy.124 Another more relevant example is privacy-enhancing 
technologies (PETs). PETs are generally “a class of technical measures 
[aimed] at preserving the privacy of individuals or groups of 
individuals.”125 PETs and other innovative solutions have already begun 
to emerge and to gain momentum due to laws such as the GDPR and the 
 
U.S., BROOKINGS:TECHTANK (May 1, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/techtank/2018/05/01/the-state-of-self-driving-car-laws-across-the-u-s/. 
 117.  See id. (noting safety concerns associated with autonomous vehicles). 
 118.  Cloning: Frequently Asked Questions, NPR, https://www.npr.org/news/ 
specials/cloning/faq_blanknav.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2019). 
 119.  See id. (noting ethical concerns associated with human reproductive 
cloning). 
 120.  See supra Section III.A. 
 121.  See Roland Bastin & Georges Wantz, The General Data Protection 
Regulation: Cross-Industry Innovation, 15 INSIDE MAGAZINE 51, 52–53 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/nl/Documents/financial-
services/deloitte-nl-fsi-inside-magazine-issue-15-june-2017.pdf (discussing the 
promotion of innovation through the GDPR); see also Rob Atkinson & Les Garner, 
Regulation as Industrial Policy: A Case Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, 1 ECON. DEV. 
Q. 358, 363–371 (concluding that regulation incentivized innovation within the 
automobile industry). 
 122.  See Bastin & Wantz, supra note 121, at 53 (noting that companies will 
continue to innovate with new rules in mind). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See Atkinson & Garner, supra note 121, at 364 (quoting a former Director 
of Vehicle Emissions at Chrysler). 
 125.  Johannes Heurix et al., A Taxonomy for Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 53 
COMPUTERS & SECURITY 1, 1 (2015). 
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CCPA.126 For example, homomorphic encryption127 schemes are 
becoming more prevalent because they allow companies to analyze data 
without compromising consumer privacy.128 
Companies would also benefit from comprehensive privacy 
legislation because such a law would increase user trust. Many consumers 
recognize that companies are collecting vast amounts of data on them and 
are deeply anxious about how their personal information is used and 
protected.129 In fact, current public opinion polls suggest that most 
Americans believe that their data is inadequately protected.130 The polls 
also suggest that this lack of trust is causing consumers to provide 
incomplete or inaccurate data to data collectors.131 
 
 126.  See THE ROYAL SOC’Y, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN PRACTICE: THE CURRENT USE, 
DEVELOPMENTAND LIMITS OF PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES IN DATA ANALYSIS 
4 (2019), https://royalsociety.org/-/media/policy/ projects/privacy-enhancing-
technologies/privacy-enhancing-technologies-report.pdf (noting the rise of PET). 
 127.  Homomorphic encryption schemes enable a company to “run 
computations on encrypted data without decrypting it.” Susan Miller, Privacy 
Enhancing Technology for Data Analysis, GCN (June 17, 2019), 
https://gcn.com/articles/2019/06/17/privacy-enhancing-technology.aspx. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See Timothy Morey et al., Customer Data Designing for Transparency and 
Trust, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-
designing-for-transparency-and-trust (“It’s not as if consumers don’t realize that 
data about them is being captured, however; 97% of the people surveyed 
expressed concern that businesses and the government might misuse their data.”).  
 130.  See, e.g., AKAMAI, CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD DATA PRIVACY SURVEY 
2018, (2018), https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/ 
report/akamai-research-consumer-attitudes-toward-data-privacy.pdf. The 
Akamai survey found that forty-two percent of respondents believed that web site 
operators did not care about using personal data responsibly or securely. Id. 
Another thirty-two percent answered “I think they mostly want to use our data 
in a responsible and secure way, but they’re bad at it.” Id. Only fourteen percent 
of respondents answered, “I think they’re mostly good at using our data in 
responsible and secure way[s].” Id. Another survey found that “[t]wo percent of 
Americans expressed trust in social networking websites or applications; six 
percent trusted online retailers; and twelve percent to nineteen percent trusted 
federal or state governments, e-mail providers, and cellphone carriers. At the high 
end, twenty-six percent trusted health insurance companies, and thirty-nine 
percent trusted banks and credit card companies.” NAT’L SCI. BD., SCIENCE & 
ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, 7–71, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/ 
nsb20181/assets/404/science-and-technology-public-attitudes-and-
understanding.pdf. Yet another study, conducted by the Pew Research Center, 
found that “[a] majority of Americans (64%) have personally experienced a major 
data breach, and relatively large shares of the public lack trust in key 
institutions—especially the federal government and social media sites—to protect 
their personal information.” AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND 
CYBERSECURITY, (Jan.26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/ 
01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/.  
 131.  See, e.g., Patients Holding Back Health Information Over Data Privacy Fears, 
HIPAA J. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.hipaajournal.com/patients-holding-back-
health-information-over-fears-of-data-privacy-8634/. A consumer poll, 
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The lack of consumer trust and data quality is concerning for private 
companies because trust is the cornerstone to many customer 
experiences.132 Consumer trust has long been linked to customer 
satisfaction—which ensures greater customer retention—positive 
reviews and references, and improved financial outcomes for the 
company.133 Additionally, consumer trust is more important than ever 
because consumers are bombarded with options—what was once a choice 
between a couple of brands is now a global mix of hundreds.134 
Compliance with privacy rules could become an effective marketing tool 
to distinguish one company from another.135 
Furthermore, user trust promotes data quality.136 Good-quality data 
is important for a myriad of reasons. First, it promotes reliable outputs by 
more accurately predicting consumer behavior.137 These outputs enable 
companies to better predict consumer trends and develop products that 
maximize profit. Higher quality data also increases efficiency by 
decreasing the amount of time spent validating and correcting inaccurate 
data.138 Finally, good-quality data allows companies to better market their 
products through more accurate targeting and communication.139 
Due to the importance of data quality and consumer trust, 
companies should prioritize measures that will increase both. States can 
 
completed by Black Book in 2016, found that eighty-seven percent of healthcare 
patients were unwilling to comprehensively share all of their health information 
with their providers. Id. Eighty-nine percent of consumers who had visited a 
healthcare provider in 2016 admitted to withholding some information during 
their visits. Id. 
 132.  Blake Morgan, How to Build Trust With Your Customers, FORBES (June 11, 
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2018/06/11/how-to-build-
trust-with-your-customers/#2f76ca411cd3. 
 133.  Chatura Ranaweea & Jaideep Prabhu, On the Relative Importance of 
Customer Satisfaction and Trust as Determinants of Customer Retention and Positive 
Word of Mouth, 12 J. OF TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR MKTG. 82, 89 
(2003), https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/palgrave.jt.5740100.pdf. 
 134.  Vanessa Mitchell, Why Customer Trust is More Vital to Brand Survival Than 
It’s Ever Been, CMO FROM IDG (June 12, 2018), https://www.cmo.com.au/ 
article/642102/why-customer-trust-more-vital-brand-survival-than-it-ever-
been/. 
 135.  Companies are already beginning to emphasize privacy as a way to 
market their products to consumers. See, e.g., Mike Wuerthele, ‘Privacy. That’s 
iPhone’ Ad Campaign Launches, Highlights Apple’s Stance On User Protection, 
APPLEINSIDER (Mar. 14, 2019), https://appleinsider.com/articles/19/03/14/ 
privacy-thats-iphone-ad-campaign-launches-highlights-apples-stance-on-user-
protection. 
 136.  Morey et al., supra note 129. 
 137.  Hugo Moreno, The Importance of Data Quality—Good, Bad or Ugly, FORBES 
(June 5, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2017/06/05/the-
importance-of-data-quality-good-bad-or-ugly/#299fc96010c4. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
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increase user trust and data quality by adopting comprehensive privacy 
legislation. Polling suggests that adopting a policy that provides 
individuals with greater control over and protection of their data can 
increase public trust.140 If Alaskans believe that the data they share online 
will be safe, they will be more likely to provide accurate data about 
themselves.141 Therefore, private companies should welcome 
comprehensive data privacy legislation because its adoption could benefit 
private companies. 
IV. AMERICAN VALUES CHANGE THE CALCULUS: CERTAIN 
ELEMENTS OF OTHER COMPREHENSIVE PRIVACY LAWS ARE 
LIKELY INCOMPATIBLE WITH AMERICAN VALUES 
This Section will detail how the American conception of privacy is 
unique and how it substantially affects any proposed privacy legislation. 
The American conception of privacy focuses on privacy as liberty. The 
importance of liberty is perhaps even more overt in Alaska with the state’s 
naturally rugged terrain and fiercely independent residents.142 To better 
understand the American, and thus Alaskan, conception of privacy this 
Section will contrast the American conception with the European 
conception of privacy as dignity. Then it will argue that the American 
conception of privacy coupled with the prevalence of the First 
Amendment would likely prevent the adoption of a provision granting 
the right to be forgotten. 
A. The Alaskan and American Conception of Privacy 
The American conception of privacy is unique. For Americans, 
privacy focuses on protecting liberty.143 The focus on liberty is perhaps 
even more distinct in Alaska, “the home of people who prize their 
individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in 
order to achieve a measure of control over their own lifestyles which is 
 
 140.  See, e.g., Abigail Geiger, How Americans Have Viewed Government 
Surveillance and Privacy Since Snowden Leaks, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACTTANK (June 
4, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/06/04/how-americans-
have-viewed-government-surveillance-and-privacy-since-snowden-leaks/. The 
Pew Research Center Survey conducted in 2015 found that ninety-three percent 
of Americans found it important to be in control of who can get information about 
them. Id. It also found that ninety percent of Americans also believed that 
controlling what information is collected about them is important. Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). 
 143.  James Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus 
Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1161 (2004). 
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now virtually unattainable in many [other] states.”144 Privacy as liberty is 
best understood as the right to be free from unwanted government 
intrusions into private spaces, especially into one’s home.145 Liberty has 
evolved beyond spatial bounds to also protect freedom of belief, thought, 
and expression.146 Yet American privacy law, however construed, still 
“tends to imagine the home as the primary defense, and the state as the 
primary enemy.”147 Generally, where American law recognizes a privacy 
violation, it is precisely because the government has involved itself in the 
matter.148 Thus, the less involved the government is in an alleged privacy 
violation and the further it is from one’s home, the less likely the violation 
will be recognized.149 
To better understand the American and Alaskan conception of 
privacy, it is helpful to contrast it with the European Union’s conception 
of privacy. Whereas the American notion of privacy focuses on privacy as 
liberty, the European conception centers on privacy as dignity.150 The 
Europeans’ conception of privacy as dignity is best understood as the 
“right to one’s image, name, and reputation.”151 What matters to 
Europeans is the right to control their public image. European privacy 
law, specifically the right to be forgotten, has developed to protect a kind 
of personhood where every person, no matter his or her social status, has 
the right to a respectable public image.152 
Additionally, the United States Constitution does not provide an 
explicit right to privacy.153 Federal privacy rights have thus been implied 
by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution.154 This 
 
 144.  Ravin, 537 P.2d at 504. 
 145.  Susan P. Stuart, Fun with Dick and Jane and Lawrence: A Primer on Education 
Privacy as Constitutional Liberty, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 563, 572 (2004). 
 146.  Id. The freedoms of thought, belief, and expression are encompassed in 
the First Amendment. Section IV.B infra describes how the First Amendment has 
influenced the development of American privacy law. 
 147.  Whitman, supra note 143, at 1215. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See id. at 1194–95 (explaining how privacy protections are significantly 
more limited outside the home). 
 150.  Id. at 1161. 
 151.  Id. at 1167. 
 152.  Id. at 1211 (“[Dignity is defined as a] certain kind of personhood: a kind 
of personhood founded in the commitment to a society in which every person, of 
every social station, has the right to put on a respectable public face.”). 
 153.  Compare U.S. CONST. with Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, 2012 O.J. (C 326), ch. II, art. 8; see also Ryan Moshell, And Then There Was 
One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward 
Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 357, 373 (2005) (describing the 
lack of an explicit right to privacy in the United States). 
 154.  See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the right to 
privacy through the penumbras of enumerated rights in the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
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approach is inherently limiting because rights explicitly recognized by the 
United States Constitution will always supersede privacy rights. 
Although the Alaska Constitution recognizes an explicit right to privacy, 
these rights must not conflict with rights expressly recognized by the 
Federal Constitution.155 Therefore, even if the Alaska legislature passed 
legislation that was consistent with the Alaska Constitution, the law could 
be struck down federally if it is considered inconsistent with the Federal 
Constitution. 
B. The Right to Be Forgotten 
Any proposed law should exclude the right to be forgotten. The right 
to be forgotten, a uniquely European concept arising from the European 
conception of privacy as dignity,156 enables a consumer to request that a 
business delete all data pertaining to him that is no longer necessary for a 
legitimate business or legal purpose.157 
The adoption of a right to be forgotten would likely be incompatible 
with the First Amendment. The First Amendment generally prevents the 
government from passing laws that control or limit the dissemination of 
information.158 Occasionally, an individual’s privacy expectations conflict 
with the dissemination of information. In conflicts between privacy 
expectations and the First Amendment, the First Amendment almost 
always prevails.159 The First Amendment’s dominance arises from its 
 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 155.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV (establishing that the federal constitution, and 
federal law generally, take precedence over state laws and constitutions). 
 156.  See generally Whitman, supra note 143 (discussing the differences between 
the American conception of privacy and the European conception). 
 157.  GDPR: Right to be Forgotten, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-
info.eu/issues/right-to-be-forgotten/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2019). This concept is 
a key component of the GDPR. However, the concept existed long before it was 
explicitly written into law. For example, in Google v. Spain, the European Court of 
Justice ruled that European citizens have the right to request that companies 
operating commercial search engines that gather personal information for profit, 
such as Google, remove links to personal information. Opinion of Advocate 
General Jääskinen, Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia 
Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 2013 E.C.R. 
424. 
 158.  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1050–51 (2000). 
 159.  See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1975) (holding that unless 
there is a finding of malicious intent, press statements are protected under the 
First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or inaccurate); N.Y. Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that news publications could not 
be liable for libel of public officials unless there is proof of actual intent or 
recklessness); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1048–49 
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modern interpretation dictating that newsworthy information—
information of legitimate public interest—should be uninhibited.160 Thus, 
once data about any individual has been made public, it is extremely 
difficult to remove it. 
Further complicating the constitutionality of the right to be forgotten 
is the commercial speech doctrine161 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.162 Traditionally, the Court 
has applied a more relaxed version of its First Amendment tests to 
commercial speech, relying on a form of intermediate scrutiny.163 More 
recently, in Citizens United, the Supreme Court determined that 
corporations are entitled to the same First Amendment protections as 
natural persons or traditional press companies.164 Under this decision, the 
First Amendment has expanded beyond protecting only the individual 
and the media.165 Now the First Amendment protects corporations not 
only when they use information to express themselves and to keep the 
public informed, but also when they use data to market products.166 
Even though Alaska, much like the European Union, recognizes an 
explicit right to privacy, this does not permit Alaska to promote this right 
 
(1984) (holding that a newspaper’s right to publish intimate information 
outweighed Sipple’s right to keep his sexual orientation a secret because the 
information became newsworthy after Sipple became a national hero for 
preventing President Ford’s assassination).  
 160.  Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2005) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
270); see generally, Erin C. Carroll, Making News: Balancing Newsworthiness and 
Privacy in the Age of Algorithms, 106 GEO. L.J. 69 (2017) (discussing how the press 
has used the broad definition of newsworthiness to shield itself against invasion 
of privacy lawsuits).  
 161.  The commercial speech doctrine is a tricky doctrine without a concrete 
definition. Kathryn E. Gilbert, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center 
Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591, 596 (2013). 
However, if the speech “proposes a commercial transaction,” or is “related solely 
to the economic interests of the speaker,” it is considered commercial speech. Id. 
at 598. 
 162.  558 U.S. 310 (2010).  
 163.  If the court determines that the speech in question is commercial speech, 
then the regulation curtailing such speech would have to directly advance the 
asserted government interest, and the regulation must be narrowly tailored. Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1980). 
 164.  558 U.S. at 365–66. 
 165.  See id. at 319 (“The Government may regulate corporate political speech 
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that 
speech altogether.”). 
 166.  Id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or For the 
Press as a Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 538–39 
(2012) (noting that the Supreme Court continues to provide equal treatment to 
speakers without regard to whether they are members of the press); United States 
v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168–69 (2nd Cir. 2012) (holding that off-label promotion 
of FDA-approved drugs is protected by the First Amendment). 
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at the expense of the First Amendment. The First Amendment provides 
broad protection of expression. Thus, the right to be forgotten is not easily 
defensible under the First Amendment’s current interpretation. However, 
legislation in Alaska could include a number of other privacy protections 
that would sufficiently address the underlying concerns driving the right 
to be forgotten. These possibilities are discussed in the following Section. 
V. WHAT THIS PRIVACY LEGISLATION SHOULD INCLUDE 
This Section will discuss what the Alaska legislature should include 
in its comprehensive privacy law. It will begin by arguing that any 
comprehensive privacy law should be grounded in the Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) privacy principles.167 It will then describe 
specific elements that should be included, using the CCPA168 and the 
GDPR169 for guidance. 
A. Establishing a Strong Foundation: Utilization of a Commonly 
Accepted Framework 
The privacy legislation should be grounded in a set of broadly 
applicable principles predicated on the APEC privacy principles.170 The 
APEC privacy principles include broad notions such as notice, the 
prevention of harm, collection limitation, use limitation, choice, 
maintenance of the integrity of personal information, security safeguards, 
and accountability.171 Grounding legislation in the APEC privacy 
principles will provide a strong base of data protection and user control, 
 
 167.  ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, APEC PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 2015 
(2017). 
 168.  CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (2019). 
 169.  Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 4, of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to 
the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 170.  Though the Fair Information Privacy Principles (FIPPs) and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) privacy 
principles are more commonly used when discussing privacy principles, I chose 
the APEC privacy principles because I found their language more appealing. The 
APEC privacy principles are essentially the same as the OECD privacy principles; 
however, I prefer their phrasing over the OECD privacy principles. See Andrei 
Gribakov, Cross-Border Privacy Rules in Asia: An Overview, LAWFARE (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/cross-border-privacy-rules-asia-overview 
(noting the similarities between the APEC privacy principles and the OECD 
principles). 
 171.  See ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOPERATION, supra note 167, at 10–22 (listing the 
APEC principles).  
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while simultaneously providing the legislature with a sound starting 
point that other nations around the world have used. Thus, the Alaska 
legislature should consider utilizing the APEC privacy principles as the 
foundation of any proposed legislation. 
First, the Alaska law should require companies to develop data 
collection and use policies and procedures that prevent data’s misuse.172 
Specifically, the companies should be required to consider the risks 
associated with the use of personal data and take proportionate measures 
to mitigate the harm based on the likelihood and severity of harm 
threatened by such use.173 The required compliance program should 
compel companies to provide clear and easily accessible statements about 
their data privacy policies before or at the time that personal data is 
collected.174 If the statement cannot be provided before or at the time of 
collection, then the company should provide it as soon as practicably 
possible after collection.175 Upon completion of a risk analysis, companies 
should limit collection to information that is relevant to a specific purpose 
that is both lawful and fair.176 
Once the data is collected, companies should limit the use of the 
collected data to circumstances that fulfill the original purposes of 
collection (unless the individual provides consent), to provide a service 
or product requested by the consumer, or to meet a legal obligation.177 
Companies should also ensure that consumer information is accurate, 
complete, and up-to-date.178 Additionally, companies should implement 
appropriate safeguards to minimize loss or unauthorized access, use, 
modification, or disclosure of personal information.179 These safeguards 
should balance the likelihood and severity of harm resulting from usage 
of the personal data, the context in which the data is stored, and the data’s 
sensitivity.180 The safeguards should be periodically reassessed and 
 
 172.  See id. at 10 (recognizing the need to prevent the misuse of such sensitive 
information). 
 173.  Id. at 10–11. 
 174.  See id. at 11 (noting that statements should include “a) the fact that 
personal information is being collected; b) the purpose for which personal 
information is collected; c) the types of persons or organizations to whom 
personal information might be disclosed; d) the identity and location of the 
personal information controller . . . ; e) the choices and means the personal 
information controller offers individuals for limiting the use and disclosure of, 
and for accessing and correcting, their personal information.”). 
 175.  Id. at 12. 
 176.  Id. at 13. Notice to and consent of the individual should be provided 
during collection, where appropriate. Id. at 14. 
 177.  Id. at 14. 
 178.  Id. at 17. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. 
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reviewed.181 
Second, the law should provide consumers with certain explicit 
rights. The law should empower consumers to exercise some choice 
regarding the collection, use, and disclosure of their information through 
clear, prominent, accessible, and affordable mechanisms.182 Consumers 
should also be able to obtain confirmation from the controller of whether 
it holds personal information about them.183 Upon provision of sufficient 
proof of identity, the company should provide the individual with the 
requested data.184 The company should also provide consumers with the 
right to correct, complete, or amend information about them.185 This 
ensures that the data retained by companies on individuals is accurate 
and up to date. If the company denies a request, it should provide reasons 
for its denial and an opportunity for the consumer to appeal the 
decision.186 
Finally, the law should ensure that companies are held accountable 
for compliance with the aforementioned principles. Thus, the law must 
contain enforcement provisions that facilitate compliance. Companies 
should also be required to exercise due diligence and take reasonable 
steps, when transferring data, to ensure that the recipient sufficiently 
protects personal information.187 
Compliance with the APEC privacy principles will provide a solid 
foundation upon which to build. These principles not only ensure an 
adequate level of data protection, but also provide for some commonality 
among jurisdictions that have already passed privacy regulation.188 Thus, 
 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 15. 
 183.  Id. at 17–18. 
 184.  Id. at 18. The requested data should be provided at a non-excessive 
charge, in a reasonable manner, and in a generally understandable form. Id. 
 185.  Id. These right should be provided so long as compliance with such 
request is not unreasonable or disproportionate to the individual’s privacy risk. 
Id. 
 186.  Id. at 19. 
 187.  Id. at 22. 
 188.  See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 169; Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Lei No. 13, 
709, de Agosto 14, 2018, Aug. 15, 2018 (Braz.) [hereinafter LGPD]; Kojin Joho No 
Hogo Ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act on the Protection of Personal Information], Law 
No. 57 of 2003 (Japan), translated in Amended Act on the Protection of Personal 
Information (Tentative Translation), Pers. Info. Protection Commission (Dec. 
2016) [hereinafter APPI], https://www.ppc.go.jp/files/pdf/Act_on_the_ 
Protection_of_Personal_Information.pdf. Though the GDPR, the LGPD, and the 
APPI have their differences, at their core they are founded on the same principles 
as the GDPR—the OECD privacy principles. See Kensaku Takase, GDPR Matchup: 
Japan’s Act on the Protection of Personal Information, IAPP (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-matchup-japans-act-on-the-protection-of-
personal-information/ (noting the similarities between the GDPR and the APPI); 
What is the LGPD? Brazil’s Version of the GDPR, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/gdpr-
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Alaska’s legislature should consider grounding any privacy legislation in 
these principles. 
B. Incentivizing Compliance Through Strong Penalties 
The Alaska legislature should include significant penalties for 
noncompliance in its privacy legislation. In this context, significant means 
reasonably calculated to effectively influence a business’s decision-
making calculus, without being excessive. A significant penalty will 
ensure that the businesses are not simply deciding that the fine for 
violating the legislation is more favorable than not collecting, using, or 
selling a consumer’s data. The actual or threatened imposition of 
sanctions can deter corporate wrongdoing. Because corporate activity is 
generally undertaken to achieve some economic benefit, corporate 
executives normally make business decisions based on calculations of 
potential economic costs and benefits.189 Therefore, high economic 
penalties for non-compliance could be effective in deterring companies 
from violating the law. 
Both California and the European Union have crafted legislation 
with significant penalty provisions. The Alaska legislature should look to 
these models when crafting its own penalty structure. The GDPR has the 
most extensive penalty structure, providing both a private right of action 
and hefty administrative fines for any violation of rights explicitly 
provided by the GDPR.190 Therefore, a company might be liable for 
paying both administrative fines and civil damages for the same 
violation. The CCPA, on the other hand, has far weaker penalties for 
violations. Under the CCPA, no administrative agency has the power to 
impose administrative fines.191 Furthermore, it only provides a private 
right of action under a narrow scope of circumstances: for example, when 
a company fails to implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures.192 
The Alaska legislature should consider adopting a position that lies 
somewhere between these two approaches. Instead of adopting a private 
right of action for all violations of the law, the Alaska legislature should 
 
vs-lgpd/ (last visited May 29, 2020) (noting the similarities between the GDPR 
and LGPD). The APEC privacy principles are derivative of the OECD privacy 
principles. Gribakov, supra note 170. Thus, grounding Alaska’s privacy law in the 
APEC privacy principles will reduce compliance costs by ensuring core 
similarities with other international privacy regimes.  
 189.  Charles R. Nesson, Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime: Regulating 
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (1979). 
 190.  GDPR supra note 169, at art. 79, 83.  
 191.  See generally CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (2019). 
 192.  Id. § 1798.150. 
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include a private right of action for violations of reasonable security 
practices, similar to what exists under the CCPA. Unlike the CCPA, the 
Alaska law should grant an administrative agency the authority to issue 
fines for any violation of Alaska’s privacy legislation. This approach 
should incentivize compliance without being overly burdensome by 
forcing companies to pay administrative fines and litigation expenses for 
the same violation. Citizens will be incentivized to hold companies 
accountable for data breaches resulting from poor data protection 
policies, while an administrative body will be responsible for enforcing 
all other violations of the act. An additional benefit of the bifurcation of 
responsibility is that it will reduce the future administrative agency’s 
budgetary needs. Instead of having to enforce all areas of the law, it will 
only need to focus on enforcing violations not covered under data breach 
litigation. 
C. Financial Incentives 
Another provision that the legislature should consider borrowing 
from existing privacy legislation is the CCPA’s financial incentives 
provision. The CCPA provides that “[a] business may offer financial 
incentives . . . for the collection of personal information, the sale of 
personal information, or the deletion of personal information.”193 
Financial incentives have proven successful in increasing and 
maintaining participation in other areas and could prove useful in 
encouraging consumers to part with their data. 
For example, financial incentives have been shown to increase 
participation in physical activity promotion programs utilizing activity 
trackers.194 Financial incentives, such as profit sharing, project and 
scheduled bonuses, and stock options and warrants have also been 
effective in motivating higher levels of performance and productivity in 
employees.195 Therefore, the adoption of a provision permitting private 
entities to offer financial incentives for the collection, sale, or disclosure 
 
 193.  Id. § 1798.125(b)(1). 
 194.  See Jan-Niklas Kramer et al., A Cluster-Randomized Trial on Small Incentives 
to Promote Physical Activity, 56 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. e45, e48 (2019) (noting 
that the personal financial incentive group had 5.94% participation, while the 
control group had 3.23% participation). 
 195.  Adam Grant & Jitendra Singh, The Problem with Financial Incentives—and 
What to Do About It, U. PA. (Mar. 30, 2011), https:// 
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-problem-with-financial-incentives-
and-what-to-do-about-it/; see also ANDREW BALLENTINE ET AL., THE ROLE OF 
MONETARY AND NONMONETARY INCENTIVES IN THE WORKPLACE AS INFLUENCED BY 
CAREER STAGE 1–2 (2019), https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/HR/HR01600.pdf 
(discussing the value of monetary and nonmonetary incentives).  
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of personal information could have similarly positive results of increasing 
voluntary participation. 
D. Miscellaneous Practical Considerations 
Other important aspects that should be incorporated into the 
legislation include practical provisions that will maximize its positive 
impact. The legislation should include a public policy exemption 
provision, a provision that encourages the designated supervisory 
authority to work with companies to achieve compliance, and a provision 
that limits the scope of the law. 
The legislation should include a public policy exception that enables 
companies to more freely collect, use, store, and disclose information if it 
is necessary for research purposes, public health reasons, or for the 
completion of a government contract.196 Scientific research and public 
welfare are of vital importance to society and should be appropriately 
balanced with privacy concerns. Furthermore, the government has 
become increasingly dependent on private contractors; thus, the bill 
should not prevent the government from functioning properly.197 
Therefore, a public policy exemption would ensure that the legislation 
does not unduly obstruct government operations, hinder scientific and 
historical research, or harm public health. 
Additionally, the legislation should include a provision that 
encourages the designated supervisory authority to work with companies 
to understand and become compliant with its provisions. It should be 
clear that the supervisory authority’s mission is not to mercilessly punish 
violators. Instead, the regulatory authority should understand its duty to 
help, guide, and inform companies about the legislation and upcoming 
regulatory developments, utilizing reasonable fines only as a last resort. 
Including this provision will make the supervisory authority’s objective 
clear. It would also calm businesses’ fear that the supervisory authority 
will seek only to punish violators without providing sufficient guidance. 
Finally, the legislation should be limited to larger companies. The 
Alaska legislature should consider adopting a provision similar to that 
included within the CCPA that limits the scope of the CCPA. Similar to 
the CCPA, the Alaska law should be limited to companies that do 
 
 196.   See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 169; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 
(2019). 
 197.  See Steven L. Schooner & Danieal S. Greenspahn, Too Dependent on 
Contractors? Minimum Standards for Responsible Governance, J. CONT. MGMT. 9, 10–
12 (2008) (explaining the federal government’s increased reliance on contract 
workers). 
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business in Alaska and collect consumer personal information.198 It 
should also consider adopting a requirement similar to the CCPA that 
requires a company to satisfy one of the following before being covered 
by the law: the company (1) has over $25 million in annual gross revenue; 
(2) collects, processes, or sells the consumer information of 50,000 or more 
Alaska residents; or (3) derives fifty percent or more of its annual revenue 
from selling personal data.199 Limiting the scope of the law in such a way 
will enable small companies to form and grow without being prematurely 
crushed by overly burdensome regulations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the Alaska Constitution explicitly protects the privacy rights 
of its citizens and instructs the legislature to implement these rights, 
Alaska’s legislature should adopt comprehensive privacy legislation. This 
legislation would protect Alaska citizens from privacy violations 
perpetrated by private actors. Comprehensive privacy legislation is 
necessary because current state law provides insufficient protection and 
federal comprehensive privacy legislation does not exist. In order for the 
legislation to be effective, it should be based in the APEC principles, 
create a strong enforcement regime, offer financial incentives, consider 
public policy implications, and encourage a regulatory environment that 
is focused on working with the private sector to increase compliance 
rather than simply punish violators. Finally, the legislature should 
consider cultural norms and values while crafting the legislation. If 
comprehensive privacy legislation is correctly drafted, it would promote 
Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy by protecting its citizens from 




 198.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140. 
 199.  See id. 
